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jury selection procedures in New York. Although Kern applies only
to the exercise of race-based peremptory challenges, the principles
promoted therein can and should be extended to prohibit the use
of peremptory challenges based upon factors other than race. New
York courts have already supported the application of Batson to
bar the prosecution's peremptory excusal of jurors based on char-
acteristics such as gender and hearing impairment.43 A further ex-
tension of Batson to prohibit such challenges by defense counsel
would be appropriate and consistent with the spirit of the Kern
decision.
The New York Court of Appeals in Kern properly recognized
the rights of New York citizens participating in jury selection to be
free of racial discrimination by the defense as well as the prosecu-
tion.44 Confronted with the task of balancing the equal protection
rights of criminal defendants against the equal protection rights of
prospective jurors, the Kern decision reflects New York's determi-
nation to eliminate discrimination from jury selection procedures.
Mindful of the abundant measures embodied in our criminal jus-
tice system to protect the rights of criminal defendants,45 the Kern
court properly resolved this issue in favor of the rights of New
York's jury-participating citizens. The decision could trigger other
states to broaden their state constitutions to surpass the protec-
tions presently afforded prospective jurors under Batson's inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
Such results may then induce the Supreme Court to end its peren-
nial silence on this issue. 6
Lisa A. Stancati
New York Court of Appeals overrules Bartolomeo, allowing a sus-
pect represented by counsel on a prior pending charge to answer
questions on new unrelated charges in the absence of counsel
Traditionally, the New York Court of Appeals, relying on New
See People v. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d 86, 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (2d Dep't 1990) (apply-
ing Batson to gender-based discrimination); People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (1st
Dep't 1990) (same); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (Westchester Co. Ct. 1990) (ap-
plying Batson to prosecutor's peremptory excusal of hearing impaired juror).
" See' Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653-56, 554 N.E.2d at 1243-45, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655-57.
'5 See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, and XIV; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTA-
RIES, supra note 27 (describing peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that tenderness
and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous").
11 See supra note 4.
[Vol. 65:605
1991] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
York State constitutional and statutory provisions, has provided
criminal defendants with legal protections that are far more expan-
sive than required by the United States Constitution.1 Prior to Mi-
randa v. Arizona,2 New York applied its own constitutional stan-
dards in determining the admissibility of a defendant's
uncounseled statements.3 In this tradition, the state has developed
I See People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 520-21, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 1010-11, 554 N.Y.S.2d
460, 462-63 (1990). The New York Court of Appeals has isolated itself from federal court
review by restricting the "foundation" of its decisions to the New York State Constitution
and statutes. See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203,_207, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363, 424
N.Y.S.2d 421, 423 (1980). In Cunningham, the Court of Appeals found it "unnecessary to
anticipate how the [United States] Supreme Court would decide... [a] case under existing
principles of Federal constitutional law, for ... [the court] conclude[d] that the issue
presented... may be resolved by application of principles that are firmly rooted in [the]
State's constitutional and statutory guarantees of due process of law." Id. The United
States Supreme Court traditionally has declined to review state court decisions that are
based upon adequate and independent state grounds. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117,
125 (1945) (citing Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 163-65
(1917)). The most common example of such an adequate and independent state ground is a
state court decision based in whole or in part on that state's constitution. G. GUNTHER,
CONSUTTUTIONAL LAW 57 (11th ed. 1985). The court, however, more recently has required
state courts to be extremely clear in basing its decisions on "bona fide separate, adequate
and independent state grounds." Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1983). If, however,
the state court is less than clear on this point and "the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion [the Court] will accept as
the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because
it believed that federal law required it to do so." Id. at 1040-41.
It is well-settled that a state may expand but not restrict the rights and protections
afforded individuals by the United States Constitution. Compare Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967) ("state[] [has] power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures
than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so") with Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968) (state "may not, however, authorize police conduct which trenches
upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels which it attaches to such con-
duct"). Additionally, interpretations of state law which are made by a state's highest court
are binding on the United States Supreme Court. See O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531
(1974).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Supreme Court embarked on a mission to pro-
vide "concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow"
in order to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the fifth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 441-42. "[Ihe privilege is fulfilled only when
the person is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfet-
tered exercise of his own will.'" Id. at 460 (citation omitted). The Court held that in order
to protect the "privilege," proper warnings informing the arrestee of his rights and an effec-
tive waiver of those rights by the arrestee are both prerequisites to the admissibility at trial
of any statement made by the arrestee. Id. at 476-77.
3 See People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 550-51, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25
(1960). Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), where
the Court held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to
both state and federal prosecutions, the New York Court of Appeals held that a post-indict-
ment interrogation in the absence of the defendant's counsel violated the state's constitu-
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rules independent of its federal counterparts4 to govern the right
to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination.5 Specifi-
cally, the Court of Appeals has declared that once an attorney has
entered a criminal proceeding, the right to counsel "indelibly" at-
taches and may only be waived in the presence of counsel.6 A dec-
ade ago, in People v. Bartolomeo,7 the Court of Appeals ruled that
police not only were prohibited from questioning a suspect on a
pending charge to which the right to counsel had attached, but
were also precluded from questioning that suspect on new, unre-
lated charges on which he had purportedly waived his right to
tional privilege against self-incrimination. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d at 550-51, 166 N.Y.2d at 829,
200 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
" See People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841,
842-43 (1963). The New York Court of Appeals has relied on the state constitution for many
of the rights it has afforded defendants because the Supreme Court either has not recog-
nized, or has expressly rejected those rights. Compare People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 182,
199 N.E.2d 366, 368, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (1964) (upon request of attorney, police required
to afford access to accused) with Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1985) (police
under no duty to inform defendant that attorney is attempting to make contact). Compare
People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 210, 400 N.E.2d 360, 364-65, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425-
26 (1980) (once accused invokes right to counsel, subsequent waiver outside presence of
counsel is without legal effect) with Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1981) (once
accused invokes right to counsel, he can be subjected to further interrogation if he himself
initiates communication).
5 See N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6. "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall
be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions .... No
person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... Id.;
see also CPL §§ 60.45 (admissibility of defendant's statements), 170.10(3)-(4) (right to coun-
sel), 210.15(2)-(3) (same) (McKinney 1981 & Supp 1988).
6 See People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 28-29, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503, 436 N.Y.S.2d 207,
209 (1980). Once the right to counsel "indelibly attaches" there can be "no effective waiver
of counsel unless made in the presence of counsel." Id. (citations omitted). In New York,
there are "two well-defined situations in which the right to counsel is [found] ... to attach
indelibly" and may not be waived even though the defendant has not retained or requested
an attorney. People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 521, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 1011, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460,
463 (1990). The first situation arises where "formal proceedings have [been] commenced"
against a suspect. See id. Courts have interpreted the term "formal proceedings" to include
indictment, arraignment, and charge in a felony complaint. Id. (citing Cunningham, 49
N.Y.2d at 207-08, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 424). The second situation arises
where uncharged individuals have retained or requested counsel to represent them on the
specific charge for which they are being held. See Davis, 75 N.Y.2d at 521, 553 N.E.2d at
1010-11, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63. Once an individual has requested counsel, the police are
precluded from further questioning in the absence of counsel. See id.; see also Cunningham,
49 N.Y.2d at 207-08, 400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 424 (defendant may not waive
representation in absence of counsel). But see People v. Farruggia, 61 N.Y.2d 775, 777, 461
N.E.2d 295, 296, 473 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (1984) (taping non-custodial conversation of defend-
ant not violative of right to counsel despite awareness of representation for unrelated
charge).
53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981).
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counsel." The court established a protection distinct from any right
recognized under federal law. To give substance to this new
protection, the court imposed on the police an affirmative duty to
inquire as to whether a defendant is represented by counsel on the
pending charge.' Recently, however, in People v. Bing,*0 the New
York Court of Appeals expressly overruled Bartolomeo, holding
that a suspect represented by counsel on a prior pending charge
could-even in the absence of his attorney-waive his right to
counsel with respect to new, unrelated charges."
Bing involved three cases consolidated for appeal. In People v.
Bing, 2 the defendant was a suspect in a church burglary.1  Upon
confirmation that Bing was wanted for a burglary in Ohio, the
Nassau County police arrested him on the outstanding Ohio war-
rant. 4 At the time of his arrest, Bing was represented by counsel
on the pending Ohio charge, but the New York police failed to in-
quire into this fact.' 5 After waiving his right to counsel, Bing, dur-
8 Id. at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 374-75, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. In Bartolomeo, the defend-
ant was taken into custody for questioning during a murder investigation. Id. at 230-31, 423
N.E.2d at 374-75, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. Only nine days earlier, the defendant had been
arrested on an arson charge, and although the police were aware of this prior arrest, they
were unaware the defendant had retained counsel. Id. While in custody in connection with
the murder investigation, the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and made
statements incriminating himself in the murder. Id. The Court of Appeals found that al-
though the detectives had no actual knowledge of the defendant's representation on the
prior charge, the detectives, aware that defendant had been arrested only nine days earlier,
had a duty to inquire into the defendant's representation on that charge. Id. at 231-32, 423
N.E.2d at 374-75, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The court ruled that because the detectives had
failed to make the inquiry, they were "chargeable with what such an inquiry would have
disclosed-namely, that the defendant did have an attorney acting on his behalf." Id. at
231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. Thus, the court held that the statements
made by the defendant would have to be suppressed, on the grounds that a suspect repre-
sented by counsel on a prior charge cannot effectively waive his rights in the absence of
counsel. Id. at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897-98.
0 See Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 374-75, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. The
police, however, are not charged with constructive knowledge of a defendant's representa-
tion. Id. For example, a defendant's right to counsel is not violated where that defendant
falsely indicates to police that he has no representation on an unrelated charge. See People
v. Nanni, 114 A.D.2d 592, 592-93, 494 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (3d Dep't 1985). But see People v.
Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 161, 173, 441 N.E.2d 1057, 1061, 455 N.Y.S.2d 539, 543 (1982) (knowledge
of informer imputed to state police), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983).
10 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
11 Id. at 349-51, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
12 146 A.D.2d 178, 540 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1989), aff'd, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d
1011-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
Is Id. at 179, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 335, 356, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 1026, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76, 489.
" Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76. Although the police had
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ing interrogation, acknowledged his participation in the burglary.16
In the second case, People v. Cawley, after arraignment on robbery
charges for which the defendant was represented by counsel, the
court admitted the defendant to bail.17 He absconded and re-
mained a fugitive until he was returned to the state on a bench
warrant.'8 He subsequently waived his Miranda rights and, upon
interrogation made inculpatory statements regarding new, unre-
lated charges.' 9 In the third case, People v. Medina, the defendant
was questioned on homicide charges by a detective who errone-
ously assumed that a court- had dismissed prior charges of as-
sault.20 After waiving his Miranda rights, the defendant made in-
culpatory statements which ultimately led to his conviction on the
homicide charges.2'
Relying on Bartolomeo, all three defendants moved to sup-
press the inculpatory statements, but only the defendant in Caw-
ley was successful,22 the appellate courts affirming in each case.23
The Court of Appeals however, in a five-to-four decision, overruled
Bartolomeo, affirmed Bing and Medina, and reversed Cawley.24
confirmed by teletype the existence of the Ohio action, the police never asked the Ohio
authorities or the defendant if he had retained counsel on the Ohio charge. Id. at 335, 356,
558 N.E.2d at 1013, 1026, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476, 489. Under Bartolomeo, the police were
chargeable with whatever knowledge a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed. See
Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897. Accordingly, Bing
contended that pursuant to Bartolomeo, his representation as a matter of fact must be im-
puted to the New York police. See Bing, 146 A.D.2d at 184, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
16 See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 335, 356, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 1026, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476, 489.
1" Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
Is Id.
19 Id. The police were unaware of Cawley's prior representation and after allowing him
to waive his Miranda rights, obtained inculpatory statements regarding two crimes unre-
lated to the charge on which he had been arraigned. Id.
20 Id. When the detective inquired about the assault charge, the defendant responded
that he had been "let go." Id. The detective therefore concluded that the charge had been
dismissed, when in actuality it had not. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 335-37, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477. In justifying its abandonment of
the Bartolomeo precedent, the court stated that the recurring problems inherent in
Bartolomeo demanded this drastic remedy, "notwithstanding [the] compelling concerns of
stare decisis." Id. "The modern doctrine of stare decisis with the flexibility essential if it is
to be a socially useful one has never been better stated than by Chief Judge Cardozo ...."
Baden v. Staples, 45 N.Y.2d 889, 893, 383 N.E.2d 110, 112, 410 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (1978)
(citing B. Cardozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-52 (5th ed. 1925) (emphasis
added)). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis
has "a limited application in the field of constitutional law .... Otherwise, the Constitution
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Writing for the court, Judge Simons stated that permitting a
suspect currently represented in a pending criminal case to be
questioned on unrelated charges when unrepresented on the charge
for which he is presently in custody, offends neither the state con-
stitution nor ethical principles surrounding the attorney-client re-
lationship.25 The court noted that the "right to counsel rules are
based on 'common sense and fairness' and are intended to
'[breathe] life into the requirement that the waiver of a constitu-
tional right [is] competent, intelligent and voluntary.' ,,26 The ma-
jority explained, however, that while the right to counsel is an im-
portant means of protection against police harassment, the
Bartolomeo rule imposed too heavy a burden upon law enforce-
ment at too great a cost to society.
2 7
Judge Kaye, concurring in part and dissenting in part, as-
serted that the court was "break[ing] with its proud tradition"2 of
protecting a defendant's constitutional right to counsel and that
the cases before the court provided inadequate justification for the
[would] lose[] the flexibility necessary ... to serve the needs of successive generations." New
York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1946). See generally Wachtler, Stare Decisis
and a Changing New York Court of Appeals, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 445, 446 & n.4, 448
(1985) (discussing flexiblity of stare decisis).
25 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 349-50, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485. Judge Simon
explained that:
The Constitution relates the right to counsel in criminal proceedings to that ap-
plying in civil actions.., but in a civil case an attorney representing a party is not
precluded from speaking to an adverse party on an unrelated matter... and there
is no ethical reason why law enforcement officers should be foreclosed from doing
so in a criminal case.
Id. at 350, 553 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (citation omitted). The court's state-
ment, however, is limited to situations where counsel has not already entered the proceed-
ings. Id. The court noted that there is a "bright-line rule preventing police from questioning
defendant about those charges" on which the right to counsel has been enlisted. Id. (citing
People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 169, 397 N.E.2d 709, 710-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (1979)).
26 Id. The court explained that underlying those situations where the right to counsel is
said to indelibly attach is a "recognition of the imbalance between a suspect and the agents
of the State [and] the coercive influences the State may bring to bear on one suspected of
crime." Id. at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478. Judge Simons noted, however,
the illogic that exists in a rule which forecloses a second-time offender, "who presumably
has received prior advice on how to deal with the authorities and has voluntarily chosen a
different course of action on the new charge .... from waiving his rights on the matter for
which he was detained." Id. at 342, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
27 Id. at 348, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484. Judge Simons declared that
Bartolomeo cannot be justified in light of the people's election "to strike a balance between
society's need to investigate and prosecute crime and the right of individuals to be free from
the police intimidation and harassment that can result from it." Id.
28 Id. at 351-52, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (Kaye, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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"overruling of a significant recent precedent, by -now fully a part of
the law."2 Arguing that the Court of Appeals successfully molded
the principles of Bartolomeo to advance a defendant's right to
counsel while avoiding absurd applications, Judge Kaye stated that
a "natural fear" should exist for the "immediate family" of cases
which are at the foundation of Bartolomeo.3
The New York Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the
Bartolomeo rule was "unworkable,"' and properly abandoned the
often criticized, mercurial precedent.32 At the foundation of the
Bartolomeo decision was the court's desire to protect the defen-
dant's right to counsel, however, it is submitted that other well-
29 Id. at 361, 558 N.E.2d at 1029, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (Kaye, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Judge Kaye believed that in a reasonable application of the Bartolomeo
rule, the convictions of both Bing and Medina should be affirmed. Id. at 356, 558 N.E.2d at
1026, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 489 (Kaye, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge Kaye
suggested that as to Bing, there existed "perfectly good reasons for refusing to extend
Bartolomeo beyond New York State borders." Id. at 356-57, 558 N.E.2d at 1026-27, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 489-90 (Kaye, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). As to Medina, Judge
Kaye stated that "a straightforward application of the rule that a confession elicited from a
suspect represented by counsel on unrelated charges will not be excluded if the police rea-
sonably believe those charges are no longer pending" would have sufficed to dispose of the
case without overruling Bartolomeo. Id. at 358, 558 N.E.2d at 1027-28, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 490-
91 (Kaye, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing People v. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d 111,
120-21, 480 N.E.2d 61, 68, 490 N.Y.S.2d 475, 481-82 (1985)). Judge Kaye, however, ex-
plained that Cawley fit squarely within Bartolomeo. Id. at 358-59, 558 N.E.2d at 1028, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 491 (Kaye, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
"0 Id. at 361, 558 N.E.2d at 1024, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 492 (Kaye, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part). Judge Kaye reasoned that because Bartolomeo was merely an outgrowth
of the application of principles clearly contained in a number of prior cases, it would be
reasonable to doubt the court's continued dedication to those principles. Id. at 354, 361, 558
N.E.2d at 1025, 1029, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 488, 492 (Kaye, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). For example, People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18
(1979), stood at the foundation of Bartolomeo, and in fact, the resulting rule of law has been
coined the "Rogers-Bartolomeo rule." Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 361, 558 N.E.2d at 1029, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 492 (Kaye, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
" Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
" See Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 236, 423 N.E.2d at 377, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 900 (Wachtler,
J., dissenting). Judge Wachtler stated in dissent that the Bartolomeo majority developed a
rule which benefits the repeat offender and serves as an obstacle to law enforcement. Id.; see
also Note, The Expanding Right to Counsel in New York, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 351, 366-
72 (1982) (criticizing Bartolomeo). The courts have exhibited what might be termed a gen-
eral lack of adherence to the Bartolomeo rule. See, e.g., People v. Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138,
146, 460 N.E.2d 1328, 1332, 472 N.Y.S.2d 894, 898 (1984) (limiting officer's duty of inquiry);
People v. Brennan, 129 A.D.2d 892, 893, 514 N.Y.S.2d 528, 630 (3d Dep't 1987) (conviction
affirmed notwithstanding police's knowledge of pending charges and failure to inquire about
representation). Many exceptions to the Bartolomeo rule have developed, resulting in a rule
which "cannot be applied uniformly." Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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reasoned decisions by the court will continue to provide substan-
tial safeguards against the "zeal" of the police. Originally, the
Bartolomeo rule simply appeared to be a logical extension of Peo-
ple v. Rogers,3 3 which held that where a defendant had invoked his
right to counsel on the charges for which he was taken into custody
the police were prohibited from questioning him on the current,
and any unrelated charges. 4 The essence of Rogers, however, was
that the police must not be "permitted to undo a request for coun-
sel."'35 In contrast, the Bartolomeo court refused to recognize what
one would otherwise consider to be a voluntary waiver of the assis-
tance of counsel .3  The Rogers decision provided substance to the
state constitutional right to counsel.37 The right to counsel pro-
tected by the Bartolomeo court's extension of the law, however,
rested on no more than a "fictional attorney-client relationship de-
rived from a prior charge and premised on the belief that a lawyer
would not refuse to aid his newly charged client."38
In abandoning Bartolomeo and reaffirming Rogers, the Bing
court struck the necessary balance between the state's interest in
effective law enforcement and an individual's right to be free from
police intrusion absent the assistance of counsel.39 Under
3 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
34 Id. at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
11 Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 238, 423 N.E.2d at 378, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 901 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting). The assertion of the right to counsel on the charge for which the defendant is in
custody would indicate the defendant's belief that he is unable to deal with the authorities
without the assistance of counsel. See id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting); People v. Cunningham,
49 N.Y.2d 203, 209, 400 N.E.2d 360, 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (1980) (citing Michigan v.
Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1975)).
:1 See Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 238-39, 423 N.E.2d at 378-79, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 901
(Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge Wachtler wrote that basic fairness does not require all po-
lice interrogations in all circumstances to take place in the presence of counsel. Id. (Wach-
tler, J., dissenting). "[T]here is no need for the paternalistic view that the police should
assure the assertion of a defendant's right to counsel, despite his own expressed wishes to
the contrary." Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
" See supra note 24.
38 See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021-22, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85. The
attorney-client relationship which existed in Rogers remains protected. Id. In Rogers, the
attorney had entered the proceeding relating to the defendant's arrest. Id. at 350, 558
N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485. There is a present and real duty to assist a client who
has indicated his inability to cope with the overwhelming powers of the state on the present
charge or any other matter. Id. The decision to retain counsel rests with the client, and
where no attorney appears and the defendant voluntarily foregoes representation, the
"courts are fully capable of protecting the defendant['s] rights on both the prior pending
charges and the new charges." Id.
-9 Id. at 348-50, 558 N.E.2d at 1021-22, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.
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Bartolomeo, the one most benefited was the career criminal-the
criminal most threatening to society-who likely had retained an
attorney on prior pending charges and therefore had immunized
himself from questioning regarding his most recent criminal acts,40
leading to an unintended and harmful result.4 '
The overturning of People v. Bartolomeo does not indicate a
retreat from New York's celebrated history of providing broad pro-
tections to suspects of crimes. To the contrary, the court's adher-
ence to and reaffirmation of People v. Rogers confirms a laudable
dedication to protecting the rights of criminal defendants by ade-
quately protecting them from self-incrimination and preserving the
attorney-client relationship.
Steven E. Rindner
BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
Business Corporation Law § 626(e): Two-person close corpora-
tion does not deter New York Court of Appeals from steadfast
application of statutory rule of recovery in shareholder derivative
suits
In shareholder derivative suits, the established rule of recovery
states that pecuniary awards are most commonly returned to the
corporation, rather than the shareholder-plaintiff.' New York's
4" See id. at 342, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480; Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at
239, 423 N.E.2d at 379, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 902 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
4 See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 348, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484. Because inter-
rogation is a valuable source of information for law enforcement authorities, unnecessary
extensions of Rogers seriously impedes effective crime control. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at
477-78; see also People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 34-35, 417 N.E.2d 501, 506, 436 N.Y.S.2d
207, 212 (1980) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (for centuries law enforcement has relied heavily upon
statements of guilty persons).
' See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970) (citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522 (1947)); Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A:2d 246, 249 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1970); Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 2 A.2d 904, 911-12 (1938); Wolff v. Wolff,
67 N.Y.2d 638, 641, 490 N.E.2d 532, 533, 499 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1986); Isaac v. Marcus, 258
N.Y. 257, 264, 179 N.E. 487, 489 (1932); see also 6 Z. CAvIrCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §
119.05, at 119-106 (1990) [hereinafter Z. CAVITCH] (because derivative suit enforces corpo-
rate right, recovery belongs to corporation).
The rationale underlying this rule is that the shareholder is actually seeking relief for a
corporate injury and any recovery should properly benefit the corporation. See Gordon v.
Fundamental Invs. Inc., 362 F. Supp. 41, 44-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (injury to corporation rather
than individual); Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 438 (N.D. Iowa 1946) (action stemming
from corporate injury belongs to corporation not individual shareholder); see also H. HENN
